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Abstract
This paper investigates the existence of cross-sectional differences in the response of
lending to monetary policy and GDP shocks owing to a different degree of bank
capitalization. The effects on lending of shocks to bank capital that are caused by a specific
(higher than 8 per cent) solvency ratio for highly risky banks are also analyzed. The paper
adds to the existing literature in three ways. First, it considers a measure of capitalization
(the excess capital) that is better able to control for the riskiness of banks’ portfolios than the
well-known capital-to-asset ratio. Second, it disentangles the effects of the “bank lending
channel” from those of the “bank capital channel” in the case of a monetary shock; it also
provides an explanation for asymmetric effects of GDP shocks on lending based on the link
between bank capital and risk aversion. Third, it uses a unique dataset of quarterly data for
Italian banks over the period 1992-2001; the full coverage of banks and the long sample
period helps to overcome some distributional bias detected for other available public
datasets. The results indicate that well-capitalized banks can better shield their lending from
monetary policy shocks as they have easier access to non-deposit fund-raising consistently
with the “bank lending channel” hypothesis. A “bank capital channel” is also detected, with
stronger effects for cooperative banks that have a larger maturity mismatch. Capitalization
also influences the way banks react to GDP shocks. Again, the credit supply of well-
capitalized banks is less pro-cyclical. The introduction of a specific solvency ratio for highly
risky banks determines an overall reduction in lending.
JEL classification: E44, E51, E52
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*  Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department.1.   Introduction
1
The role of bank capital in the monetary transmission mechanism has been largely
neglected by economic theory. The traditional interpretation of the “bank lending channel”
focuses on the effects of reserve requirements on demand deposits, while no attention is paid
to bank equity; bank capital is traditionally interpreted as an “irrelevant” balance-sheet item
(Friedman, 1991; Van den Heuvel, 2003). Moreover, in contrast with the wide literature that
analyzes the link between risk aversion and wealth, there is scarce evidence on the
relationship between a bank’s risk attitude and its level of capitalization. This lack of
attention contrasts with the importance given, at both an empirical and a theoretical level, to
the macroeconomic consequences of the Basel Capital Accord that designed risk-based
capital requirements for banks.
2
The main aim of this paper is to study how bank capital may influence the response of
lending to monetary policy and GDP shocks. There are two ways in which bank capital may
affect the impact of monetary shocks: through the traditional “bank lending channel” and
through a more “direct” mechanism defined “bank capital channel”. Both channels rest on
the failure of the Modigliani-Miller theorem of financial structure irrelevance but for
different reasons as we will discuss.
Bank capitalization influences the “bank lending channel” owing to imperfections in
the market for debt. In particular, bank capital influences the capacity to raise uninsured
forms of debt and therefore banks’ ability to contain the effect of a deposit drop on lending.
The mechanism is the following. After a monetary tightening, reservable deposits drop and
banks raise non-reservable debt in order to protect their loan portfolios. As these non-
reservable funds are typically uninsured (i.e. bonds or CDs), banks encounter an adverse
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2 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) for a reference on the subject.8
selection problem (Stein, 1998); low-capitalized banks, perceived to be more risky by the
market, have greater difficulty issuing bonds and therefore are less able to shield their credit
relationships (Kishan and Opiela, 2000).
The “bank capital channel” is based on three hypotheses: 1) an imperfect market for
bank equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stein, 1998; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; Cornett
and Tehranian, 1994); 2) a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities that exposes
banks to interest rate risk; 3) a “direct” influence of regulatory capital requirements on the
supply of credit. The “bank capital channel” works in the following way. After an increase in
market interest rates, a lower fraction of loans can be renegotiated with respect to deposits
(loans are mainly long-term, while deposits are typically short-term): banks therefore bear a
cost due to the maturity transformation performed that reduces profits and then capital. If
equity is sufficiently low (and it is too costly to issue new shares), banks reduce lending
because prudential regulations establish that capital has to be at least a minimum percentage
of loans (Thakor, 1996; Bolton and Freixas, 2001; Van den Heuvel, 2001a).
Bank capitalization may also influence the reaction of credit supply to output shocks.
This effect depends upon the link between bank capital and risk aversion. A part of the
literature argues that well-capitalized banks are less risk-averse. In the presence of a
solvency regulation, banks maintain a higher level of capital just because their lending
portfolios are riskier (Kim and Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992; Hellman, Murdock and
Stiglitz, 2000). In this case we should observe that well-capitalized banks react more to
business cycle fluctuations because they have selected ex-ante a lending portfolio with
higher return and risk. On the contrary, other models stress that well-capitalized banks are
more risk-averse because the implicit subsidy that derives from deposit insurance is a
decreasing function of capital (Flannery, 1989; Gennotte and Pyle, 1991) or because they
want to limit the probability of not meeting capital requirements (Dewatripont and Tirole,
1994). In this case, since the quality of the loan portfolio of well-capitalized banks is
comparatively better they should reduce their lending supply by less in bad states of nature.
The empirical investigations concerning the effect of bank capital on lending mostly
refer to the US banking system (Hancock, Laing and Wilcox, 1995; Furfine, 2000;Kishan
and Opiela, 2000; Van den Heuvel, 2001b). All these works underline the relative
importance of bank capital in influencing lending behaviour. The literature on European9
countries, instead, is far from conclusive; Altunbas et al. (2002) and Ehrmann et al. (2003)
find that lending of under-capitalized banks suffers more from monetary tightening, but their
results are not significant at conventional values for the main European countries.
This paper presents three novelties with respect to the existing literature. The first one
is the definition of capitalization; we define banks’ capitalization as the amount of capital
that banks hold in excess of the minimum required to meet prudential regulation standards.
This definition allows us to overcome some problems of the capital-to-asset ratio generally
used in the existing literature. Since minimum capital requirements take into account the
quality of banks’ balance sheet assets, the excess capital represents a cushion that controls
for the level of banks’ risk and indicates a lower probability of a bank defaulting. Moreover,
excess capital is a direct measure of banks’ capacity to expand credit because it takes into
consideration prudential regulation constraints. The second novelty lies in the attempt to
analyze the effects of capitalization on banks’ response to various economic shocks. In the
case of monetary shocks we separate the effects of the “bank lending channel” from those of
the “bank capital channel”. We provide a tentative explanation of the effect of GDP shocks
on lending based on the link between bank capital and risk aversion. Exogenous capital
shocks that refer to specific solvency ratios that supervisors set for very risky banks are also
analyzed. The third novelty is the use of a unique dataset of quarterly data for Italian banks
over the period 1992-2001; the full coverage of banks and the long sample period should
overcome some distributional bias detected for other available public datasets. To tackle
problems in the use of dynamic panels, all the models have been estimated using the GMM
estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991).
The results indicate that well-capitalized banks can better shield their lending from
monetary policy shocks as they have an easier access to non-deposit fund raising,
consistently with the “bank lending channel” hypothesis. In this respect, the bank
capitalization effect is greater for non-cooperative banks, which are more dependent on non-
deposit forms of external funds. Capitalization also influences the way banks react to GDP
shocks. Again, the credit supply of well-capitalized banks is less pro-cyclical. This result
indicates that well-capitalized banks are more risk-averse and, as their borrowers are less
risky, suffer less from economic downturns via loan losses. Moreover, well-capitalized
banks can better absorb temporarily financial difficulties on the part of their borrowers and10
preserve long-term lending relationships. Exogenous capital shocks, caused by the
introduction of a specific (higher than 8 per cent) solvency ratio for highly risky banks
determine an overall reduction of 20 per cent in lending after two years. This result is
consistent with the hypothesis that it costs less to adjust lending than capital.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
literature and explains the main link between capital requirements and banks’ loan supply.
Section 3 discusses some stylized facts concerning bank capital in Italy. In Section 4 we
describe the econometric model and the data. Section 5 presents our empirical results and the
robustness checks. The last section summarizes the main conclusions.
2.   Bank capital and the business cycle
There are several theories that explain how bank capital could influence the
propagation of economic shocks. All these theories suggest the existence of market
imperfections that modify the standard results of the Modigliani and Miller theorem. Broadly
speaking, if capital markets were perfect a bank would always be able to raise funds (debt or
equity) in order to finance lending opportunities and its level of capital would have no role.
The aim of this Section is to discuss how bank capital can influence the reaction of
bank lending to two kinds of economic disturbances: monetary policy and GDP shocks.
The first kind of shock occurs when a monetary tightening (easing) determines a
reduction (increase) of reservable deposits and an increase (reduction) of market interest
rates. In this case, there are two ways in which bank capital can influence the impact of
monetary policy changes on lending: through the traditional “bank lending channel” and
through a more “direct” mechanism defined as “bank capital channel”.
Both mechanisms are based on adverse selection problems that affect banks’ fund-
raising: the “bank lending channel” relies on imperfections in the market for bank debt
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Stein, 1998; Kishan and Opiela, 2000), while the “bank capital
channel” concentrates on an imperfect market for bank equity (Thakor, 1996; Bolton and
Freixas, 2001; Van den Heuvel, 2001a).
According to the “bank lending channel” thesis, a monetary tightening has effect on11
bank lending because the drop in reservable deposits cannot be completely offset by issuing
other forms of funding (or liquidating some assets). Therefore, a necessary condition for the
“bank lending channel” to be operative is that the market for non-reservable bank liabilities
should not be frictionless. On the contrary, if banks had the possibility to raise, limitless,
CDs or bonds, which are not subject to reserve requirements, the “bank lending channel”
would be ineffective. This is the point of the Romer and Romer (1990) critique.
On the contrary, Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and Stein (1998) claim that the
market for bank debt is imperfect. Since non-reservable liabilities are not insured and there is
an asymmetric information problem about the value of banks’ assets, a “lemon’s premium”
is paid to investors. In this case, bank capital has an important role because it affects banks’
external ratings and provides the investors with a signal about their creditworthiness. This
hypothesis implies that banks are subject to “market discipline”. Therefore the cost of non-
reservable funding (i.e. bonds or CDs) would be higher for low-capitalized banks because
they have less equity to absorb future losses and are then perceived as more risky by the
market.
3 Low-capitalized banks are therefore more exposed to asymmetric information
problems and have less capacity to shield their credit relationships (Kishan and Opiela,
2000).
4
It is important to note that this effect of bank capital on the “bank lending channel”
cannot be captured by the capital-to-asset ratio. This measure, generally used by the existing
literature to analyze the distributional effects of bank capitalization on lending, does not take
into account the riskiness of a bank portfolio. A relevant measure is instead the excess
capital, that is, the amount of capital that banks hold in excess of the minimum required to
meet prudential regulation standards. Since minimum capital requirements are determined by
the quality of banks’ balance-sheet assets (for more details see Section 3), the excess capital
represents a risk-adjusted measure of bank capitalization that gives more indications
regarding the probability of a bank default. Moreover, the excess capital is a relevant
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measure of the bank’s ability to expand credit because it directly controls for prudential
regulation constraints.
The “bank capital channel” is based on three hypotheses. First, there is an imperfect
market for bank equity: banks cannot easily issue new equity because of the presence of
agency costs and tax disadvantages (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Cornett and Tehranian, 1994;
Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; Stein, 1998). Second, banks are subject to interest rate risk
because their assets typically have a longer maturity than liabilities (maturity
transformation). Third, regulatory capital requirements limit the supply of credit (Thakor,
1996; Bolton and Freixas, 2001; Van den Heuvel, 2001a).
The mechanism is the following. After an increase in market interest rates, a smaller
fraction of loans can be renegotiated compared with deposits (loans are mainly long-term,
while deposits are typically short-term): banks therefore have to bear a cost connected with
the maturity mismatching that reduces profits and then capital. If equity is sufficiently low
and it is too costly to issue new shares, banks reduce lending, otherwise they fail to meet
regulatory capital requirements.
The “bank capital channel” can also be at work if capital requirements are currently
not binding. Van den Heuvel (2001a) shows that low-capitalized banks may optimally forgo
lending opportunities now in order to lower the risk of capital inadequacy in the future. This
is interesting because in reality, as shown in Section 3, most banks are not constrained at any
given time. It is also worth noting that, according to the “bank capital channel”, a negative
effect of a monetary tightening on bank lending could also be generated if banks face a
perfect market for non-reservable liabilities.
Bank capitalization may also influence the way lending supply reacts to output shocks.
Bank capitalization, that is bank wealth, is linked to risk-taking behaviour and then to banks’
portfolio choices; this means that lending by banks with different degrees of capitalization
(or risk aversion) may react differently to economic downturns. While a wide stream of
literature on financial intermediation has analyzed the relation between bank capitalization13
and risk-taking behaviour,
5 the nature of this link is still quite controversial. A first class of
models (Kim and Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992; Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000)
argue that well-capitalized banks are less risk-averse. In the presence of a solvency
regulation, well-capitalized banks detain a higher level of capital just because their lending
portfolio is riskier. In this case we should observe that well-capitalized banks react more to
business cycle fluctuations because they have selected “ex-ante” a lending portfolio with
higher return and risk.
In Kim and Santomero (1988), the introduction of a solvency regulation entails
inefficient asset allocation by banks. The total volume of their risky portfolio will decrease
(as a direct effect of the solvency regulation), but its composition will be distorted in the
direction of more risky assets (recomposition effect). In this model, the probability of failure
increases after capital requirements are introduced because the direct effect is dominated by
the recomposition of the risky portfolio. Along the same lines, Hellman, Murdock and
Stiglitz (2000) argue that higher capital requirements are the cause of excessive risk-taking
by banks. Since capital regulation increases the cost of funding for banks (equity is more
costly than debt) and lower the value of the bank, its management reacts by increasing the
level of credit portfolio risk.
6
There are three main implications of this class of models. First, well-capitalized banks
are less risk averse because regulation creates an incentive to do so. Second, risk-based
capital standards would become efficient only if the weights that reflect the relative riskiness
                                                          
5 The relation between wealth and attitude to risk is central to many fields of economics. As far as credit
markets are concerned, this relation has largely been employed to analyze the role of collateral in mitigating
asymmetric information problems between banks and borrowers (see Coco, 2000, for a recent survey of this
subject).
6 A different explanation is given by Besanko and Kanatas (1996). They depart from Kim and Santomero
(1988) and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) by allowing for “outside equity” (owned by shareholders
who are not in control of the firm) and by stressing the role of managerial incentive schemes in a “moral
hazard” framework. Modeling asset-substitution (among assets with different risk profiles) and effort aversion
moral hazard at the same time, they show that while a higher capital requirement reduces asset-substitution
problems, it lowers the incentive to exert the optimal amount of effort. This result rests on what they call a
“dilution effect”: if bank insiders are wealth-constrained or risk-averse, more stringent capital standards dilute
insiders’ ownership share, and thus their marginal benefit of effort. The main conclusion of the model is that, if
the effort-aversion effect is larger than the asset-substitution effect, higher capital standards induce banks to
take more risk on average. Gorton and Rosen (1996) argue that excessive risk taking among well-capitalized
banks could also reflect exogenous conditions such as managerial incompetence or a lack of lending
opportunities.14
of assets in the solvency ratio were market-based (Kim and Santomero, 1988).
7 In this case
distortion in the banks’ asset allocation disappears and capital requirements reflect the
effective risk taking of the bank.
8 Third, these models are not able to explain why banks
typically detain excess capital with respect to the minimum requirements imposed by the
supervisory authority (for example, see van den Heuvel (2003) for the US). As we will see,
this is a crucial point when studying heterogeneity in the behaviour of banks as a result of
capitalization.
A different result is reached by other models based on a portfolio approach (Flannery,
1989; Gennotte and Pyle, 1991) for which well-capitalized banks are more risk-averse. They
support this result by studying the relation between deposit insurance schemes and the risk-
taking attitude of banks. If the insurance premium undervalues banks’ risk, the implicit
subsidy from deposit insurance is a decreasing function of capital. That is, highly capitalized
banks are more risk-averse. This means that, since the quality of the loan portfolio of well-
capitalized banks is comparatively higher, such banks suffer fewer losses in the event of an
economic downturn; the small amount of write-offs allows well-capitalized banks to reduce
their lending supply by less in bad states of nature. In this class of model the presence of
capital requirements attenuates the distortions caused by deposit guarantees: banks cannot
limit the amount of equity to obtain the maximum implicit subsidy from deposit insurance.
An implication of these models is that if a bank has excess capital with respect to the
minimum requirements it is more risk-averse because it evaluates its risk more cautiously
than the supervisory authority.
The hypothesis that well-capitalized banks are more risk-averse can also be supported
by interpreting excess capital as a cushion against contingencies. When a solvency
regulation is introduced, banks have to face the possibility that they could fail to meet capital
                                                          
7 Thakor (1996) proves that a more stringent risk-based standard may reduce banks’ willingness to screen
risky borrowers. In this sense, market pricing of uninsured liabilities (the so-called “market discipline”) could
help avoid excessive risk-taking by undercapitalized banks. More cautious conclusions in evaluating the
potential effects of subordinated debt requirement are developed in Calem and Rob (1999). Sheldon (1996)
provides weak evidence that the implementation of the Basel Accord had a risk-increasing impact on bank
portfolios.
8 Analyzing a model with limited liability (capital can not be negative as in Kim and Santomero, 1988)
Rochet (1992) suggests introducing an additional regulation, namely a minimum level of capital, independent
of the size of bank assets.15
requirements and that, if this really happens, they could lose part of their control in favour of
supervisors (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Repullo, 2000; Van den Heuvel, 2001a).
Therefore, banks choose a certain excess capital at time t taking into account the possibility
that in the future they might not be able to meet regulatory standards. The amount of capital
banks hold in excess with respect of capital requirement depends on their (global) risk
aversion that is independent of the initial level of wealth.
9 Differences in (global) risk
aversion among banks may emerge not only because of heterogeneity in corporate
governance but also, and more substantially, for institutional reasons. In Italy, as we will
discuss in the following section, the institutional characteristics of credit cooperative banks
(CCBs) are very different from those of limited companies. If we allow for heterogeneity in
(global) risk aversion among banks, the excess capital becomes a crucial measure to capture
differences in the risk profile of banks’ portfolios. The simple capital-to-asset ratio is no
longer informative because it does not capture the constraint due to regulation.
3.   Some stylized facts on bank capital
The 1988 Basel Capital Accord and its subsequent amendments require capital to be
above a threshold that is defined as a function of several types of risk. In other words, it is
possible to distinguish between the default risk (credit risk) and the risk related to adverse
fluctuations in asset market prices (market risk).
10 In Italy, the capital requirements for credit
risks were introduced in 1992, those for market risks in 1995.
As far as credit risk is concerned, capital must be at least equal to 8 per cent of the total
amount of risk-weighted assets (solvency ratio).
11 A bank-specific solvency ratio (higher
                                                          
9 A simple way to say that bank i is globally more averse than bank j is to assume that the objective function
of bank i is a concave transformation of bank j objective function.
10 In general, the need for capital requirements arises to overcome moral hazard problems by inducing
banks to detain a “socially optimal” amount of capital. In the event of a crisis, the lower is the leverage ratio,
the higher the probability that a bank will fail to pay back its debts. The moral hazard problem is amplified in
the presence of a deposit insurance system. For a more detailed explanation of the rationale for capital
requirements, see among others, Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington (1993), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994),
Vlaar (2000) and Rime (2001).
11 In Italy, regulation establishes a minimum capital requirement as a function of the amount of risk-
weighted assets (and certain off-balance sheet assets). Assets are classified into five buckets with different risk
weights. Risk weights are zero for cash and government bonds, 20 per cent for bank claims on other banks, 50
per cent for mortgage lending, 100 per cent for other loans to the private sector, 200 per cent for participating in16
than 8 per cent) can be set in the case of a poor performance in terms of asset quality,
liquidity and organization. On the contrary, the ratio decreases to 7 per cent for banks
belonging to a banking group that meets an 8 per cent solvency ratio on a consolidated basis.
Capital requirements against market risks are related to open trading positions in securities,
foreign exchange and commodities.
12
Banks have to hold an amount of capital that must be at least equal to the sum of credit
and market risk capital requirements.
13
One of the objectives of the 1988 Basel Accord was to increase banks’ capitalization
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999). We observe that banks’ capitalization
increased during the period that preceded the implementation of the Basel Accord in Italy
and it declined slightly afterwards (Fig. 1). It seems, therefore, that banks constituted
sufficient capital and reserve endowments before risk-based capital requirements were
implemented. This apparently supports the thesis that bank capital is sticky.
Large banks’ capitalization has been constantly below the average.
14 By contrast,
credit cooperative banks (CCBs), which are typically very small, are better capitalized than
                                                                                                                                                                                  
highly risky non-financial firms (firms that have recorded losses in the last two years). Until September 1996
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where  j k is the solvency ratio,  j WA  the total amount of risk-weighted assets,  i α  is the risk weight for asset
type i and  ij A  is the unweighted amount of the i-type asset bank j holds.
12 Market risk capital requirements are computed on the basis of a quite complex algorithm. Regulations
distinguish between a “specific risk” and a “general risk”. The former refers to losses that can be determined by
market price fluctuations, which are specifically related to the issuers’ economic conditions. The latter is
related to asset price fluctuations correlated to market developments (“systematic risk”). The capital
requirement depends on issuer characteristics and on the asset maturity. “Ceteris paribus”, the capital
requirement against market risks is lower for banks belonging to a group.
13 Prudential regulations allow banks to meet capital requirements by holding an amount of capital that is
defined as the sum of the so-called “Tier 1” and “Tier 2” capital (regulatory capital). “Tier 1” or “core capital”
includes stock issues, reserves and provisions for “general banking risks”; “Tier 2” or “supplementary” capital
consists of general loan loss provisions, hybrid instruments and subordinated debt. “Tier 1” capital is required
to be equal at least to 50 per cent of the total. Subordinated debts must not exceed 50 per cent of “Tier 1”
capital.  Recently, banks have been allowed to issue subordinated debts specifically to face market risk
requirements (the so-called “Tier 3” capital).
14 We have considered large banks to be those with total assets of more than 10 billions euro in September
2001. To control for mergers we have assumed that consolidation took place at the beginning of the period (see
Appendix 2 for further details of merger treatment).17
other banks. The different degree of capitalization among Italian banks could reflect a
diverse capacity to issue capital. As capital is relatively costly, banks minimize their
holdings, subject to different “adjustment cost” constraints. This implies that, “ceteris
paribus”, capitalization is smaller for those banks that incur lower costs in order to adjust
their level of capital. As we have pointed in Section 2, differences in the level of
capitalization also depend on banks’ risk aversion related to different corporate governance
and institutional settings.
For all groups of banks the excess capital (the amount that banks hold in excess of the
minimum regulatory capital requirement) has always been always much greater than zero.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that capital is difficult to adjust and banks create a
cushion against contingencies. If we define as  it x  the ratio between regulatory capital and
capital requirement this should be close to one if banks choose their capital endogenously to
meet the constraint imposed by the supervision authority. In reality, we observe that this
ratio is significantly greater than one (Fig. 2). The cushion is smaller for large banks than for
CCBs. On the basis of the literature discussed in the previous section, this stylized fact is
consistent with the hypothesis that small banks are more risk averse than large banks.
Figure 3 shows the time evolution of the deviation of excess capital from its “long-run








where,  i x  is the average bank capitalization and
i x σ is the standard error of  it x . We can
interpret  i x  as a proxy of the “long-run equilibrium” capitalization, that we assume to be
bank specific. We then calculate, at every time t, the aggregate index as a mean of each bank
index.
We have split banks into three different groups: large banks, other banks (CCBs
excluded) and CCBs. The indicator is more stable for large banks, more volatile for CCBs.
This seems consistent with the view that large banks have easier access to capital markets
and therefore can adjust their capitalization degree more rapidly to loan demand fluctuations;
capitalization is less flexible for smaller banks and for CCBs, which are more dependent on
self-financing.18
Figure 4 shows the maturity transformation performed by banks. As we discussed in
the previous section, the existence of a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities is a
necessary condition for the “bank capital channel” to be at work. Since loans typically have a
longer maturity than bank fund-raising, the average maturity of total assets is longer than
that of liabilities. In this case, as predicted by the “bank capital channel”, the bank bears a
cost when interest rates are raised and obtains a gain when they are lowered. The difference
between the average maturity of assets and that of liabilities is greater for CCBs than for
other banks. In fact, CCBs’ balance sheets contain a larger percentage of long-term loans,
while their bond issues are more modest. For example, at the end of September 2001, the
ratio between medium and long-term loans over total loans was 57 per cent for CCBs and 46
per cent for other banks. On the contrary, the ratio between bonds and total fund-raising was,
respectively, 27 and 29 per cent. These differences were even greater at the beginning of our
sample period. Therefore, the analysis of the maturity mismatch between assets and
liabilities indicates that there is room for a “bank capital channel” in Italy with a potentially
greater effect for CCBs.
There is no conclusive evidence about the effects of bank capital on the lending
behaviour of Italian banks. In principle, the financial structure of the Italian economy during
the 1990s makes it more likely that a “bank lending channel” was at work (see Gambacorta,
2001). Most empirical papers based on VAR analysis confirm the existence of such a
channel in Italy (Buttiglione and Ferri, 1994; Angeloni et al., 1995; Bagliano and Favero,
1995; Fanelli and Paruolo, 1999; Chiades and Gambacorta, 2003). However, there is much
less evidence on cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of the “bank lending
channel” in Italy, due to capitalization (see de Bondt, 1999; Favero et al., 2001; King 2002;
which analyze mainly the effect of bank size and liquidity; some evidence of the effect of
capitalization on the lending of Italian banks is detected by Altunbas, 2002). So far no
evidence has been provided of the existence of the so-called “bank capital channel”.
Apart from the differences in specification, all these paper use the BankScope dataset
which, as Ehrmann et al. (2003) point out suffers from two weaknesses. First, the data are
collected annually, which might be too infrequent to capture the adjustment of bank
aggregates to monetary policy. Second, the sample of Italian banks available in BankScope
is biased towards large banks. For example, in 1998 only 576 of the 921 Italian banks were19
included in the BankScope dataset. Moreover, the average size of the banks was 3.7 billions
of euros against 1.7 for the total population. To tackle these problems our analysis is based
on the Bank of Italy Supervisory Reports database, using quarterly data for the full
population of Italian banks.
4.   The econometric model and the data
The empirical specification, based on Kashyap and Stein (1995), is designed to test
whether banks with a different degree of capitalization react differently to a monetary policy
or a GDP shock. A simple theoretical framework that justifies the choice of the specification
is reported in Appendix 1.
15
The empirical model is given by the following equation, which includes interaction
terms that are the product of the excess capital with the monetary policy indicator and the
real GDP; all bank specific characteristics (excess capital, cost due to maturity mismatching,
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with i=1,…, N  (N = number of banks) and  t=1, …, T  (t= quarters) and where:
it L = loans of bank i in quarter t
MP t  = monetary policy indicator
t y  = real GDP
π t = inflation rate
                                                          
15 The model presented in Appendix 1 is a slightly modified version of the analytical framework in
Ehrmann et al. (2003). There are two main differences. First, it introduces bank capital regulation in a static
way as in Kishan and Opiela (2000). Second, following the literature on bank capital and risk attitude (see
Section 2) we model loan losses as a function of bank capitalization.20
it X  = measure of excess capital
it ρ  = cost per unit of asset that the bank incurs in case of a one per cent increase in MP
it Φ  = control variables.
The model allows for fixed effects across banks, as indicated by the bank-specific
intercept µi. Four lags are introduced in order to obtain white noise residuals. The model is
specified in growth rates to avoid the problem of spurious correlations among variables that
are likely to be non-stationary.
The sample used goes from the third quarter of 1992 to the third quarter of 2001. The
interest rate taken as monetary policy indicator is that on repurchase agreements between the
Bank of Italy and credit institutions in the period 1992-1998, and the interest rates on main
refinancing operation of the ECB for the period 1999-2001.
16
CPI inflation and the growth rate of real GDP are used to control for loan demand
effects. The introduction of these two variables allows us to capture cyclical movements and
serves to isolate the monetary policy component of interest rate changes.
17














where EC stands for excess capital (regulatory capital minus capital requirements) and A
represents total assets. The excess capital indicator is normalized with respect to the average
across all the banks in the respective sample in order to obtain a variable that sums to zero
over all observations. This has two implications. First, the sums of the interaction terms
                                                          
16 As pointed out by Buttiglione, Del Giovane and Gaiotti (1997), in the period under investigation the repo
rate mostly affected the short-term end of the yield curve and, as it represented the cost of banks’ refinancing, it
represented the value to which market rates and bank rates eventually tended to converge. It is worth noting
that the interest rate on main refinancing operations of the ECB does not present any particular break with the
repo rate.
17 For more details on data sources, variable definitions, merger treatment, trimming of the sample and



















∆    in equation (1)  are zero for the average bank
(
1 it X
− =0). Second, the coefficients  j β  and  j δ  are directly interpretable, respectively, as the
average monetary policy effect and the average GDP effect.
To test for the existence of a “bank capital channel” we introduce a variable ( i MP ρ ∆ )
that represents the bank-specific interest rate cost due to maturity transformation. In
particular  i ρ  measures the loss (gain) per unit of asset the bank suffers (obtains) when the
monetary policy interest rate is raised (decreased) by one percentage point. We compute this
variable according to supervisory regulations relating to interest rate risk exposure that
depends on the maturity mismatching among assets and liabilities.
18 In other words, if a
bank’s assets have a longer maturity that its liabilities  i ρ  is positive and indicates the cost
per unit of asset a bank bears if interest rates are raised by one per cent. To work out the real
cost we therefore multiply this measure by the actual change in interest rates. The term
i MP ρ ∆  represents the real cost (gain) that a bank bears (obtains) in each quarter. As
formalized in Appendix 1, this measure influences the level of loans. Since the dependent
variable is a growth rate, we include this measure in first differences.
The set of control variables  it Φ  include a liquidity indicator, given by the sum of cash
and securities to total assets ratio, and a size indicator, given by the log of total assets. The
liquidity indicator is normalized with respect to the mean over the whole sample period,
while the size indicator has been normalized with respect to the mean on each single period.
This procedure removes trends in size (for more details see Gambacorta, 2001). As for the
other bank specific characteristics, liquidity and size indicators refer to t-1 to avoid an
endogeneity bias.
The fact that supervisors can set solvency ratios greater than 8 per cent for highly risky
banks (see Section 3), allows us to test for the effects of exogenous capital shocks on bank
lending. We analyze the impact of these supervisory actions on lending in the first two years,
computing different dummy variables (one for each quarter following the solvency ratio
                                                          
18 See Appendix 2 for further details.22
raise) that equal 1 for banks whose solvency ratio is higher than 8 per cent. This allows us to
capture the bank lending adjustment process. A specific dummy variable controls for the
effects of the introduction of market risk capital requirements in the first quarter of 1995.
The sample represents 82 per cent of total bank credit in Italy. Table 1 gives some
basic information on what bank balance sheets look like. Credit Cooperative Banks (CCBs)
are treated separately because they are considerably smaller, more liquid and better
capitalized than other banks. This evidence is consistent with the view that smaller banks
need bigger buffer stocks of securities because of their limited ability to raise external
finance on the financial market. This interpretation is confirmed on the liability side, where
the percentage of bonds is smaller among CCBs. The high capitalization of CCBs is due, at
least in part, to the Banking Law prescription that significantly limits the distribution of net
profits.
19
Within each category, banks are split according to their capitalization.
20 Low-
capitalized banks are larger and less irrespective of their form (CCBs or other banks), liquid
and they issue more bonds than well-capitalized banks. While these differences are small
among CCBs, they are quite significant among non-CCBs. Among non-cooperative banks,
low-capitalized banks are much larger than well-capitalized ones; a greater share is listed
and belongs to a banking group. Moreover, they issue more subordinated debt to meet the
capital requirements. This evidence is consistent with the view that, “ceteris paribus”,
capitalization is lower for those banks that bear less adjustment costs from issuing new
(regulatory) capital; large and listed banks can more easily raise funds on the capital market
and they can also rely on a wider set of “quasi-equity” securities that can be issued to meet
capital requirements (e.g. subordinated debts); at the same time, banks belonging to a group
                                                          
19 According to Art. 37 of the 1993 Banking Law “Banche di credito cooperativo must allocate at least 70
per cent of net profits for the year to the legal reserve.”
20 A “low-capitalized” bank has a capital ratio equal to the average capital ratio below the 10
th percentile, a
“well-capitalized” bank, that of the banks above the 90
th percentile. Since the characteristics of each bank could
change over time, percentiles are worked out on mean values.23
can better diversify the risk of regulatory capital shortage if an internal capital market is
active at the group level.
21
5.   The results
The results of the study are summarized in Table 2, which presents the long-run
elasticities of bank lending with respect to the variables.
22 The models are estimated using
the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) which ensures efficiency and
consistency provided that the models are not subject to serial correlation of order two and
that the instruments used are valid (which is tested for with the Sargan test).
23
The existence of asymmetric effects due to bank capital is tested considering three
samples. The first includes all banks and is our benchmark regression; the other two consider
separately credit cooperative and other banks. These sample splits are intended to capture
differences in the bank capital effect due to the institutional characteristics discussed in the
previous sections.
                                                          
21 Houston and James (1998) analyze the role of internal capital markets for banks’ liquidity management.
The same framework could be applied to soften the regulatory capital constraint among banks belonging to the
same group.
22 For example, the long-run elasticity of lending with respect to monetary policy for the average bank
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th percentile. It is interesting to note that testing
the null hypothesis that monetary policy effects are equal in the long-run among banks with different












=  in equation (1). Standard errors
for the long-run effect have been approximated with the “delta method” which expands a function of a random
variable with a one-step Taylor expansion (Rao, 1973). In order to increase the degree of freedom we drop the
contemporaneous and the fourth lags that are statistically not different from zero.
23 In the GMM estimation, instruments are the second and further lags of the quarterly growth rate of loans
and of the bank-specific characteristics included in each equation. Inflation, GDP growth rate and the monetary
policy indicator are considered exogenous variables.24
From the first row of the table it is possible to note that the effect of excess capital on
lending is always significant and positive: well-capitalized banks are less constrained by
capital requirements and have more opportunity to expand their loan portfolio. The effect is
higher for CCBs than for other banks because they encounter higher capital adjustment
costs: CCBs are more dependent on self-financing and cannot easily raise new regulatory
capital.
The response of bank lending to a monetary policy shock has the expected negative
sign. These estimates roughly imply that a one per cent increase in the monetary policy
indicator leads to a decline in lending of around 1.2 per cent for the average bank. The effect
is higher for CCBs (-1.8 per cent) than for other banks (-0.2 per cent), which have more
access to markets for non-reservable liabilities. Testing the null hypothesis that monetary
policy effects are equal among banks with a different degree of capitalization is identical to
testing the significance of the long-run coefficient of the interaction between excess capital
and the monetary policy indicator (see “Excess capital*MP” in Table 2). As predicted by the
“bank lending channel” hypothesis the effects of a monetary tightening are smaller for banks
with a higher capitalization, which have easier access to non-deposit financing. Bank
capitalization interaction with monetary policy is very high (in absolute value) for non-
CCBs, which are more dependent on non-deposit forms of external funds. It is worth noting
that well-capitalized non-CCBs are completely insulated from the effect of a monetary
tightening (the effect is statistically not different from zero).
The effects of the so-called “bank capital channel” are reported on the eighth row of
Table 2. The coefficients have the expected negative sign for all banks groups. These
estimates roughly imply that an increase (decrease) of one basis point in the ratio between
the maturity transformation cost and total assets determines a reduction (increase) of 1 per
cent in the growth rate of lending. The reduction (increase) is bigger for CCBs, which as we
saw in Section 3, typically have a greater maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities.
In fact, CCBs balance sheets contain a larger percentage of long-term loans, while their
bonds issues are more modest. Another possible explanation for the greater effect of the
“bank capital channel” for CCBs could be they make less use of derivatives to shield the
maturity transformation gap. With these characteristics CCBs bear a higher cost when
interest rates are raised and obtain a higher gain in the opposite case. To sum up, the results25
indicate the existence of a “bank capital channel” that amplifies the effects of monetary
policy changes on bank lending and asymmetric effects of such a channel among banks
groups.
The models show a positive correlation between credit and output. A one per cent
increase in GDP (which produces a loan demand shift) determines a loan increase of around
0.7 per cent. The effect is smaller for CCBs than for other banks. This has two main
explanations. First, for CCBs local economic conditions are more important than national
ones; second, they have closer customer relationships because they grant credit primarily to
their members (see the 1993 Banking Law, Art. 35).
The interaction term between GDP and excess capital is negative. This means that the
credit supply of well-capitalized banks is less dependent on the business cycle. This result is
consistent with Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), where capital is found to have a significantly
negative effect on credit risk. On theoretical grounds our findings are consistent with
Flannery (1989) and Gennotte and Pyle (1991), who argue that well-capitalized banks are
more risk averse and select ex-ante borrowers with less probability of defaulting. Their risk
attitude therefore limits credit supply adjustments in bad states of nature, preserving credit
relationships. This explanation needs to be discussed in relation to the institutional categories
of Italian banks. From the sample split it emerges that the heterogeneity coefficient is highly
significant only for CCBs, while there are no significant asymmetric effects for the other
banks. This is consistent with the stylized fact discussed in Section 3 that CCBs are more
risk-averse than other banks. They detain high levels of excess capital and are more able to
insulate the effect of an economic downturn. As in Vander Vennet and Van Landshoot
(2002), capital provides banks with a structural protection against credit risk changes.
Looking at Table 2, well-capitalized CCBs are able to completely insulate the effect of GDP
on their lending. On the other hand, non-CCBs seem to be risk-neutral: the effect of a 1 per
cent increase in GDP on lending does not differ too much between well-capitalized (1.3 per
cent) and low-capitalized banks (1.5).
As explained in Section 4, the effects of exogenous capital shocks on bank lending are
captured by dummy variables related to the introduction of a specific (higher than 8 per cent)
solvency ratio. In this case there are not many differences among the three samples. The
introduction of specific solvency ratio determines an overall reduction of around 20 per cent26
in bank lending after two years. The magnitude of the effect is similar among banks groups.
This result seems consistent with the hypothesis that issuing new equity can be costly for a
bank in the presence of agency costs and tax disadvantages (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stein,
1998; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; Cornett and Tehranian, 1994).
5.1   Robustness checks
We test the robustness of these results in several ways. The first test introduces
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The reason for this test is the possible presence of endogeneity between inflation and
capitalization; excess capital may be higher when inflation is high or vice versa. However,
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where all variables are defined as before, and  θ t describes a complete set of time dummies.
This model completely eliminates time variation and tests whether the three pure time
variables used in the baseline equation (prices, income and the monetary policy indicator)
capture all the relevant time effects. The results are presented in the fourth column of Table
2. Again, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms do not vary much between the27
two kinds of models, which testifies to the reliability of the cross-sectional evidence
obtained.
A geographical control dummy is introduced in each model and given the value of one
if the head office of the bank is in the North of Italy and zero if elsewhere. In all cases the
maturity transformation variable and the interactions between monetary policy and output
shocks with respect to excess capital remains unchanged.
The last robustness check includes the interaction between monetary policy and the
liquidity indicator in the baseline regression. The reason for this test is to verify if the
asymmetric effects of monetary policy due to excess capital remains relevant; the
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The results, which are presented in the fifth column of Table 2, confirm that liquidity
is an important factor in enabling banks to attenuate the effect of a decrease in deposits on
lending but, at the same time, it leaves the distributional effects of excess capital unaltered.
The result on liquidity is in line with Gambacorta (2001) and Ehrmann et al. (2003); banks
with a higher liquidity ratio are better able to buffer their lending activity against shocks to
the availability of external finance by drawing on their stock of liquid assets. In these
studies, however, bank capital (defined as the capital-to-asset ratio) does not significantly
affect the banks’ reaction to a monetary policy impulse. This additional test therefore allow
us to cast some doubt on the use of the capital-to-asset ratio to capture distributional effects
in a lending regression because this measure poorly approximates the relevant capital
constraint under the Basel standards.
6.   Conclusions
This paper investigates the existence of cross-sectional differences in the response of
lending to monetary policy change and output shocks due to a different degree of28
capitalization. It adds to the existing literature in three ways. First, it considers a measure of
capitalization that is better able to capture the relevant capital constraint under the Basel
standards than the well-known capital-to-asset ratio. Defining banks’ capitalization as the
amount of capital that banks hold in excess of the minimum required to meet prudential
regulation standards we are able to measure the effect of capital requirements and to reflect
information on the structure of the loan portfolio or its risk characteristics. Second, it
disentangles the effects of the “bank lending channel” (triggered by a reduction in deposits)
from those of the “bank capital channel” (due to maturity transformation); different kinds of
shocks on lending for the Italian banking system are analyzed: not only monetary policy
shocks, but also GDP and capital shocks. In the last case, shocks are genuinely exogenous
because they refer to an increase in minimum capital requirements that supervisors set for
very risky banks. Third, it uses a unique dataset of quarterly data for Italian banks over the
period 1992-2001; the full coverage of banks and the long sample period should overcome
some distributional bias detected for other available public dataset.
The main results of the study are as follows. Well-capitalized banks can better shield
their lending from monetary policy shocks as they have easier access to non-deposit fund-
raising consistently with the “bank lending channel” hypothesis. In this respect, the bank
capitalization effect is greater for non-cooperative banks, which are more dependent on non-
deposit forms of external funds. A “bank capital channel” is also detected, with stronger
effects on cooperative banks whose balance sheets contain a larger maturity mismatch
between assets and liabilities. Capitalization also influences the way banks react to GDP
shocks. Again, the credit supply of well-capitalized banks is less pro-cyclical. This result has
at least two explanations. First, well-capitalized banks are more risk-averse (as argued by
Flannery, 1989, and Gennotte and Pyle, 1991) and, as their borrowers are less risky, suffer
less from economic downturns via loan losses. Second, well-capitalized banks can better
absorb temporarily financial difficulties of their borrowers and preserve long-term lending
relationships. Exogenous capital shocks due to the imposition of a specific (higher than 8 per
cent) solvency ratio for highly risky banks determine an overall reduction of 20 per cent in
lending after two years. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that it costs less to
adjust lending as opposed to capital.29
This study shows that capital matters for the response of bank lending to economic
shocks. However, it is difficult to deduce the implications of this result in terms of the new
directions of the Basel Accord to be implemented in 2005. The main goal of the amendments
is to make the risk weights used to calculate the solvency ratio more risk-sensitive. In fact, as
shown in Section 3, the actual buckets are somewhat too crude and could lead to regulatory
arbitrage. The new weights will be dependent on the ratings of borrowers given by rating
agencies or internal models developed by banks. This has two consequences. First, the new
Basel Accord will affect banks differently, depending on their riskness: for riskier (safer)
banks the level of capital requirements will be higher (lower), compared with the present
regulation which set a solvency ratio that is almost constant among different classes of risk
for private customers. As a direct consequence, heterogeneity in the response of lending to
GDP shocks due to capitalization could be attenuated. On the other hand, by imposing a
higher degree of information disclosure, the new capital regulation could make “market
discipline” more effective, thereby reducing the information problems on which the “bank
lending channel” and the “bank capital channel” rely.
Second, the pro/counter-cyclicality of capital regulations will strongly depend upon the
capacity of external rating agencies and internal models to anticipate economic downturns. If
borrowers are downgraded during a recession this should lead to higher capital requirements
that could exacerbate the effect on lending. On the contrary, if ratings are able to anticipate
slowdowns or respond smoothly to economic conditions (they are set “through the cycle”)
the effects of monetary policy and GDP shocks on lending should be less pronounced.Appendix 1 – A simple theoretical model
In order to justify the empirical framework adopted for the econometric analysis, in
this Appendix we develop a simple one-period model highlighting the main channels
through which bank capital can affect loan supply (see Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Ehrmann,
2003). A causal interpretation of the step of the model is given in Figure A1.
24
Figure A1
The sequential steps of the model
The balance-sheet constraint of the representative bank is given by the following
identity:
(A1.1) X R B D S L + + + = +
where  L stands for loans, S for securities, D for deposits, B for bonds, R for capital
requirements and X for excess capital. At the end of t-1 bank capital, defined as  R X K + = ,
                                                          
24 This causal interpretation has the sole aim of stressing that bank-specific characteristics are given in t-1
and are predetermined with respect to the maximization in t. On the contrary, the steps in t, whose subscript is
omitted in the model for simplicity, are simultaneously determined.
t-1 t
Bank capital K is a fixed
endowment, determined by
the realization of profit at the
end of period t-1
The maturity transformation
performed by the bank in t is
represented by the
composition of its balance-
sheet at the end of t-1
The management of
the bank determines
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is a given endowment. This hypothesis indicates that the management of the bank (which we
assume is also its owner to rule out problems of informational asymmetries) does not alter
the capitalization of the firm buying or selling shares between t-1 and t; capital therefore
remains fixed until period t when it will be modified by the realization of the profit or the
loss (Kt=Kt-1+πt).
25
At the beginning of period t the management of the bank determines the risk strategy
for credit allocation. The allocation of credit portfolio among industries, sectors of activity,
geographical areas, depends upon the risk aversion of the management, which we indicate
with θ∈[-∞,+∞]. This measure could be interpreted as an Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute
risk aversion that is equal to zero if the bank is risk-neutral. It is worth noting that the
decision on the risk strategy profile is taken before the actual supply of credit. The latter will
be chosen to meet loan demand after the realization of economic conditions. Therefore, in
choosing the risk profile the management of the bank takes into account ex-ante information
about the possible distribution of the macro variables (income, price, interest rates) and
selects a strategy for each possible state of the world.
The choice of risk profile for the lending portfolio (that, as we have shown, depends on
the risk aversion of the management of the bank) has two important implications. First, it
influences the percentage of non-performing loans (j) that are written-off at time t. Second, it
affects the average rate of return on lending since risky loans are associated with a higher
level of return. This means that the risk premium is negatively related to the bank’s risk
aversion.
In the spirit of the actual BIS capital adequacy rules, R is given by a fixed amount (k)
of loans.
26 We assume that capital requirements are linked only to credit risk (loans) and not
                                                          
25 This is an extreme case of capital costly adjustment that we assume here to simplify the model. This
hypothesis is widely used in the literature (see, amongst others, Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and
Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992). Issuing new equity can be costly for a bank. The main reasons are agency
costs and tax disadvantages (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stein, 1998; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; Cornett and
Tehranian, 1994). A discussion on the exogeneity/endogeneity of the capital goes beyond the scope of this
study. Here exogeneity has been assumed in order to simplify the algebra since it does not modify the main
findings of the model. In the empirical part of the paper this hypothesis is relaxed using the Arellano and Bond
(1991) procedure, which allows us to control for endogeneity through instrument variables (see Section 4).
26 A more complicated version of the capital constraint would have not changed the main result of the
analysis. A possible extension of the simple capital requirement rule could be to consider a different weight on32
to interest rate risk (investment in securities, which are considered completely safe for
simplicity).
(A1.2) kL R =
We assume that banks hold capital in excess of capital requirements. This hypothesis is
consistent with the fact that capital requirement constraints are slack for most banks at any
given time. Banks may hold a buffer as a cushion against contingencies (Wall and Peterson,
1987; Barrios and Blanco, 2001) as they face capital adjustment costs or to convey positive
information on their economic value (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Another explanation is that banks face a private cost of bankruptcy, which reduces their
expected future income. Van den Heuvel (2001a) argues that even if capital requirements are
currently not binding, a low-capitalized bank may optimally forgo profitable lending
opportunities now in order to lower the risk of future capital inadequacy. To capture this
aspect in a simple way we assume that banks pay a lump-sum tax if they cannot meet capital
requirements in t.
The private sector sets its lending demand after the realization of macroeconomic
variables . The bank acts on a loan market characterized by monopolistic competition, which
enables it to set the interest rate along the loan demand schedule.
27 The interest rate on loans
(il ) is therefore given by:
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(A1.3) 01 2 3
d
lm ic Lc ic y c p η =+ + + +  (c0>0, c1>0, c2>0, c3>0)
                                                                                                                                                                                  
non-performing loans (j L): R=k1 (1-j) L+ k2 j L, with 1≥k2≥k1≥0. This should reflect the fact until 1996 the
weight applied to non-performing loans was double with respect to performing loans (k2=0.16>k1=0.08).
Another possible extension could be to consider a different weight for loans backed by real guarantee. Indeed,
loans to the private sector bear a weight of 0.04 if backed by real guarantees, 0.08 in all other cases (non-
performing loans backed by real guarantees included).
27 This hypothesis is generally adopted by the existing literature on bank interest rate behaviour. For a
survey on modeling the banking firm see Santomero (1984). See also Green (1998) and Lim (2000).
28 For simplicity we assume that all banks face the same loan demand schedule, i. e. the coefficients ci for
i=0, 1, 2, 3, are equal among banks. The model could easily be extended to a more general case where each
coefficient depends upon some bank-specific characteristics, but this goes beyond the scope of this study. The
simplifying hypothesis allows us to concentrate on the effects of bank-specific characteristics on loan supply.33
which is positively related to loan demand (L
d), the opportunity cost of self-financing,
proxied by the money market interest rate (im), the real GDP (y), the price level (p) and the
risk-premium (η).
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The risk premium in equation (A1.3) is negatively related to the bank’s risk aversion
which, as discussed before, influences the risk profile of the loan portfolio. Therefore, we
have:
(A1.4) 01 η ηη θ =+  ( η0>0, η1<0)
Loans are risky and, in each period, a percentage j of them is written off from the
balance sheet, therefore reducing the bank’s profitability. The percentage of loans which
goes into default (j) depends inversely on the state of the economy, proxied by real GDP, and
on the risk-taking behaviour of the bank (θ ).Therefore, per-unit loan losses of the bank are
given by:
(A1.5) 01 2 (,) j yj y j y j θθ θ =+ + ( j0<0, j1<0, j2<0)
Equation (A1.5) states that the quality of bank portfolios reacts differently to changes
in the state of the economy and this in turn depends on the bank’s ex-ante risk attitude. The
cross-product indicates that the write-offs of more risk-averse banks react less to GDP
shocks. If the bank is risk-neutral (θ =0), j depends only on real GDP.
Following the literature that links risk-aversion and bank capital (see Section 2), we
hypothesize that the parameter θ is related to the excess capital X at the end of period t-1:
30
(A1.6)  1 t X θµ− =
                                                          
29 As far as GDP is concerned, there is no clear consensus about how economic activity affects credit
demand. Some empirical works underline a positive relation because better economic conditions would
improve the number of projects becoming profitable in terms of expected net present value and therefore
increase credit demand (Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993). This is also the hypothesis used in Bernanke and
Blinder (1988). On the contrary, other works stress the fact that if expected income and profits increase, the
private sector has more internal sources of financing and this could reduce the proportion of bank debt
(Friedman and Kuttner, 1993). On the basis of the evidence provided by Ehrmann et al. (2001) for the four
main countries of the euro area and by Calza et al. (2001) for the euro area as a whole, we expect that the first
effect dominates and that a higher income determines an increase in credit demand (c2>0).
30 An analysis of the causal direction of influence between capital (wealth) and risk aversion goes beyond
the scope of this paper. In the model we suppose that this link is bi-directional. For a discussion on the link
between bank capital and risk aversion see Section 2.34
It is worth noting that we analyze the link between risk aversion and excess capital
instead of the level of capital. As discussed in the introduction and in Section 2, the excess
capital is a risk-adjusted measure of bank wealth that is independent of prudential
supervision constraints and therefore can be correctly studied with respect to risk aversion.
On the contrary, the level of capital, which is widely used in the existing literature, does not
give information on the structure of the loan portfolio or its risk characteristics.
As discussed in Section 2, the effect of the excess capital on banks’ risk attitude is
controversial in the existing literature; therefore, the sign of µ is not certain a priori. A
positive value of µ would imply that well-capitalized banks are more risk-averse: they ex-
ante select less risky borrowers whose ability to repay their debts is less influenced by output
shocks. In this case, the low burden of write-offs on their profit and loss account allows well-
capitalized banks to smooth the effects of an economic downturn on credit supply. In other
words, well-capitalized banks can better perform the “intertemporal smoothing function”
described by Allen and Gale (1997) as they are more able to preserve credit relationships in
bad states of nature. On the contrary, if µ is negative, well-capitalized banks are more risk-
tolerant and the quality of their credit portfolio should suffer more from the effects of a drop
in income.
The bank holds securities in order to face unexpected deposit outflows. We assume
that security holdings are a fixed share of outstanding deposits:
(A1.7)   sD S = (0<s<1)
Deposits are fully insured and are not remunerated. Their demand schedule is
negatively related to the deposit opportunity cost that is equal to the monetary policy rate im:
(A1.8) m i d D   = (0<d<1)
The latter equation implies that the overall amount of deposits is completely controlled
by the monetary authority.
                                                          
31 Note that a reverse causality from risk aversion to capital requirements and then excess capital is
excluded in the current regulatory framework characterized by an almost constant loan solvency ratio.35
Because banks are risky and bonds are not insured, the bond interest rate incorporates a
risk premium that we assume depends on banks’ excess capital at the end of period t-1.
Subscribers of the bonds have a complete knowledge of the last balance sheet of the bank
and demand a lower interest rate if, taking into account the riskiness of the bank credit, it is
well- capitalized. We include both a direct influence of capitalization on the spread between
the interest rate on bonds and the money market rate and an interaction term between the two
rates.
(A1.9) () 011 1 , bm m t mt iiX i b X b i X −− =+ + (b0<0, b1<0)
This assumption implies that the relevance of the “bank lending channel” depends on
banks’ capital adequacy, which determines the degree of substitutability between insured
bank debt, typically deposits, and uninsured bank debt, typically bonds or CDs (Romer and
Romer, 1990). Equation (A1.9) also implies that, because of “market discipline”, it could be
optimal for banks to hold a capital endowment greater than the lowest level necessary to
meet regulatory capital requirements.




tm Ci L S ρ − =∆ + (ρ >0)
where 
MT C  represents the total cost (or gain) borne (obtained) by the bank in the event of a
change in monetary policy due to the maturity transformation performed by the bank in t-1,
before the monetary shock occurs. In particular, ρτ−1 reflects how assets and liabilities differ
in terms of interest rate sensitivity at the end of t-1, and depends on the maturity
transformation performed by the bank. In particular, this parameter represents the cost (gain)
per unit of asset that the bank incurs in case of a one per cent variation in the monetary
policy interest rate. Therefore, since loans typically have a longer maturity than bank fund-
raising we expect that ρ τ−1 >0. In this case the bank bears a cost when interest rates are
raised and obtains a gain in the opposite case.
Operating costs (C
OC), which can be interpreted as screening and monitoring costs,
depend on the amount of loans:36
(A1.11) 01
OC Cg g L =+ (g0>0, g1>0)
The representative bank maximizes its profits subject to the balance-sheet constraint
(A1.1), the regulatory capital requirement (A1.2) and loan demand (A1.3):
32
                        
MT OC
Lm B L Max i L i S jL i B C C π =+− −− −
. . (A1.1), (A1.2) and (A1.3) st
Solving the maximization problem it is possible to find the optimal level of loan
supply:
(A.12) 01 2 3 14 516 1 7 1
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Equation (A.12) states that monetary tightening causes a decrease in lending (Ψ2<0)
only if the “bank lending channel” (b0(1-k)<0) is greater than the “opportunity cost” effect
(c1>0). The effect of a monetary squeeze is smaller for well-capitalized banks (Ψ3>0), which
are better able to compensate for the deposit drop by issuing bonds at a lower price. Credit
supply reacts positively to an output expansion (Ψ4>0), but the effect depends on the bank’s
excess capital, affecting its risk attitude and its sensitivity to the business cycle. The effect of
capital regulation on credit supply could be checked through the solvency ratio (k) and the
excess capital (X). A higher capital requirement (k high) reduces the effect of the “bank
lending channel” (it lowers b0(1-k)) and the effects via “market discipline” (it lowers Ψ3). On
the other hand, excess capital alters the asymmetric effects on output, but its sign is not clear
                                                          
32 In this model, banks optimally choose loan supply. Since K is given, the optimal choice of L determines
the level of excess capital X>0. We assume that banks never expand loan supply until the point where X=0,
because they want to avoid capital inadequacy costs (see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994 and Van den Heuvel,
2001a).37
“a priori” because, as we have seen, this also depends on the bank risk aversion effect. The
effects of the so-called “bank capital channel” are captured by  6 0 Ψ<; due to the longer
maturity of bank assets with respect to liabilities (ρ>0), in the event of monetary tightening
( m i ∆ >0) the bank bears a maturity transformation cost; given the capital constraint, the
reduction in profit determines a decrease in lending.
The last coefficient reflects the direct influence of excess capital on loan supply. A
sufficient condition for  7 Ψ  to be positive is that the saving obtained by the bank on bond
funding due to market discipline (represented by the absolute value of b2) overcomes the
risk-aversion effect (whose sign is uncertain “a priori”).
The empirical model (1) in Section 4 is given by a slightly modified version of
equation (A.12). In particular, there are three main differences. The first is due to the non-
stationary of some variables that could cause problems of spurious correlation. Since these
variables have a unit root (this has been checked by means of an Augmented Dickey Fuller
test) we have expressed the model in growth rates. The ratios Xt-1 and ρt-1 turn out to be
stationary and are included in levels. The second difference concerns the number of lags
used in the specification. In fact, the contemporaneous variables were not sufficient to
capture the dynamics of the interaction terms and the macro variables. We have therefore
included a more complete dynamic setting, allowing the adjustment to be completed in four
periods (one year). We rule out the interactions of Xi,t-1 with contemporaneous values of the
monetary policy indicator and real GDP to avoid endogeneity problems. The third difference
relates to the inclusion of quarterly dummies (to tackle seasonality problems) and other
control variables (to control for specific effects in the loan supply equation due to regulation,
see Section 4). These modifications are standard in the literature. For similar approaches see
Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) for the US and Ehrmann et al. (2003) for the euro-area
countries.Appendix 2 - Description of the database
The data are taken from the Bank of Italy Supervisory Reports database. Loans do not
include bad debts and repurchase agreements. Liquidity is equal to the sum of cash,
securities and repurchase agreements at book value (repos have been considered for
statistical reasons). The size of a bank is measured by the logarithm of the total balance
sheet. Capitalization is given by the ratio of regulatory capital in excess of capital
requirements to total asset (see Section 3). The growth rates are computed by first difference
of variables in logs.
The cost a bank bears owing to its maturity transformation function stems from the

















where Aj (Pj) is the amount of assets (liabilities) of j months-to-maturity and χj (ζj) measures
the increase in interest on assets (liabilities) of class j due to a one per cent increase in the
monetary policy interest rate (∆im=0.01). Broadly speaking if  () jj j j
j
AP χζ ⋅−  >0,  i ρ
represents the cost per unit of asset bank i bears if the monetary policy interest rate is raised
by one percentage point. We obtain χi and ζi directly from supervisory regulations on
interest rates risk exposure. In particular, the regulations assume, for any given class j of
months-to-maturity: 1) the same sensitivity parameter (χj =ζj) and 2) a non-parallel shift in
the yield curve (∆im=0.01 for the first maturity class and then decreasing for longer maturity
classes). Then, for each bank, after classifying assets and liabilities according to their
months-to-maturity class, we computed the bank-specific variable  i ρ . This variable was
multiplied then by the change in the monetary policy indicator (∆im) to obtain the realized
loss (or gain) per unit of asset in each quarter.
In assembling our sample, the so-called special credit institutions (long-term credit
banks) have been excluded since they were subject to different supervisory regulations39
regarding the maturity range of their assets and liabilities. Nevertheless, special long-term
credit sections of commercial banks have been considered part of the banks to which they
belong. Foreign banks are also excluded as they are subject to their “home country control”.
Particular attention has been paid to mergers. In practice, it is assumed that these took
place at the beginning of the sample period, summing the balance-sheet items of the merging
parties. For example, if bank A is incorporated by bank B at time t, bank B is reconstructed
backward as the sum of the merging banks before the merger.
Data are quarterly and are not seasonally adjusted. Three seasonal dummies and a
constant are also included. For cleaning, all observations for which lending, liquidity and
total assets are equal to or less than zero were excluded. After this treatment, the sample
includes 691 banks and 26,108 observations.
An observation has been defined as an outlier if it lies within the top or bottom
percentile of the distribution of the quarterly growth rate of lending. If a bank has an outlier
in the quarterly growth rate of lending it is completely removed from the sample. The final
dataset was composed of 558 banks (20,727 observations).
A “low-capitalized” bank has a capital ratio equal to the average capital ratio below the
10
th percentile, a “well-capitalized” bank, that of the banks above the 90
th percentile. Since
the characteristics of each bank could change over time, percentiles have been worked out on
mean values.Tables and figuresTable 1
DATA DESCRIPTION
(September 2001)
 large banks 
(2)
 large banks 
(2)
Number of banks 40   40   401   15   16   5   155   31   55   55   556  
Banks belonging to a group (1) 0.0   0.0   0.0   33.3   81.3   100.0   71.6   100.0   0.0   67.9   19.9  
Listed banks 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   37.5   80.0   16.8   51.6   0.0   26.8   4.7  
Mean total assets (millions of euros) 160                246                205                1,341             12,468           35,766           9,160             38,581           159                12,486           2,692            
 - fraction of total assets 7.8   12.0   100.0   1.4   14.1   12.6   100.0   84.2   0.6   45.9   100.0  
Liquidity/total assets 33.5   21.2   25.3   23.1   18.7   15.3   18.2   13.9   34.3   17.8   23.3  
Loans/total assets 39.7   50.0   47.8   40.8   51.3   50.1   49.4   50.0   39.3   51.1   48.3  
Bad loans/total loans 7.5   6.4   5.6   11.2   8.3   10.0   6.2   4.3   6.6   5.7   5.8  
Bonds issues/deposits and bonds 18.5   30.6   27.3   23.5   30.7   31.7   29.3   33.5   19.5   29.4   27.9  
Subordinated debt/capital requirements 0.0   2.9   2.3   1.1   19.3   16.9   14.4   34.1   1.4   16.7   5.7  
(Regulatory capital - capital requirements) / total assets 16.0   2.5   7.9   10.4   1.6   1.3   4.3   3.3   15.4   2.0   6.9  
Share of branches located in the South of Italy 32.5   26.7   22.6   26.3   28.6   44.7   22.6   19.9   34.5   27.4   22.6  
Source: Bank of Italy supervisiory reports.
 (1) Only groups with more than one bank member are considered. - (2) Large banks are non-cooperative banks with total assets over 10 billion euro in September 2001
Note: A “low-capitalized” bank has a capital ratio (regulatory capital - capital requirements/total assets) equal to the average capital ratio below the 10th percentile, a “well-capitalized” bank has the average 


















THE EFFECT OF BANK CAPITAL ON LOAN SUPPLY
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Excess capital (t-1) 0.744 *** 0.021 1.058 *** 0.032 0.516 *** 0.057 0.763 *** 0.019 0.713 *** 0.022
Long-run coefficients
Monetary policy (MP) -1.187 *** 0.055 -1.778 *** 0.091 -0.201 0.175 -1.282 *** 0.056
Real GDP growth 0.668 *** 0.087 0.751 *** 0.125 1.350 *** 0.295 0.708 *** 0.087
Inflation (CPI) 1.127 *** 0.116 2.558 *** 0.175 0.654 ** 0.300 1.312 *** 0.117
Excess capital*MP
("bank lending channel") 8.010 *** 0.906 8.921 *** 1.119 11.790 *** 2.139 7.363 *** 0.714 6.445 *** 0.984
MP effect for:
   well-capitalized banks -0.622 *** 0.092 -1.106 *** 0.110 0.176 0.196 -0.799 *** 0.100
   low-capitalized banks -1.615 *** 0.066 -2.159 *** 0.122 -0.968 *** 0.208 -1.628 *** 0.068
Maturity transformation
("bank capital channel") -1.173 *** 0.053 -1.287 *** 0.091 -0.597 *** 0.154 -0.933 *** 0.011 -1.116 *** 0.054
Excess capital*GDP
("risk-aversion effect") -4.894 *** 1.621 -11.620 *** 2.517 -2.304 4.092 -4.336 *** 1.274 -4.375 *** 1.650
GDP shock effect for:
   well-capitalized banks 0.323 ** 0.145 -0.126 0.217 1.278 *** 0.329 0.380 ** 0.153
   low-capitalized banks 0.930 *** 0.122 1.246 *** 0.180 1.491 *** 0.388 0.943 *** 0.122
Liquidity *MP
("bank lending channel") 0.992 *** 0.248
MP effect for:
   liquid banks -1.124 *** 0.058
   low-liquid banks -1.416 *** 0.071
Specific capital requirements
(total effect after two years) -0.199 *** 0.023 -0.188 *** 0.016 -0.186 * 0.107 -0.215 *** 0.021 -0.243 *** 0.023
Sargan test (2nd step; pvalue) 0.115 0.146 0.092 0.112 0.106
MA(1), MA(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.129 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.479 0.000 0.103 0.000 0.131
No of banks, no of observations 556 17792 401 12795 155 4960 556 17792 556 17792
*=significance at the 10 per cent; **=significance at the 5 per cent; ***=significance at the 1 per cent.
Dependent variable: quarterly
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Source: Bank of Italy, supervisory reports.
(1) Large banks are those with more than 10 billions of euros at 2001:3.
Fig.2
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Source: Bank of Italy, supervisory reports.
(1) Large banks are those with more than 10 billions of euros at 2001:3.Fig. 3
The evolution of banks’ capitalization (1)
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